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Abstract 
 
This article strives to understand the properties, potentials and limits of middle power 
activism in a changing global order. Extensive debate on the rise of emerging powers 
notwithstanding, the potential contributions of emerging middle powers in regional and 
global governance and the imminent challenges they face in their struggle for an 
upgraded status in the hierarchy of world politics is an understudied issue. This study 
aims to fill this gap by offering a broad conceptual framework for middle power activism 
and testing it with reference to the Turkish case. In this context, we aim to address the 
following questions: what kind of roles can emerging middle powers play in a post-
hegemonic international system? What are the dynamics, properties, and limitations of 
emerging middle power activism in regional and global governance? Based on an 
extensive study of the Turkish case, our central thesis is that emerging middle powers can 
make important contributions to regional and global governance. Their ultimate impact, 
however, is not inevitable but depends on a complementary set of conditions that is 
outlined in this study.  
 
Keywords: emerging middle powers, post-hegemonic world order, Turkish political economy, 
Turkish foreign policy 
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This article aims to explore potential roles to be played by the ‘emerging middle powers’ 
in changing regional and global governance with particular reference to Turkey. The 
international system is currently passing through a major transformation that is likely to 
alter the global hierarchy of power relations in a permanent fashion. A quasi-consensus 
has already emerged in International Relations and the Global Political Economy 
literature that multipolarity will constitute the dominant trend of the coming decades, as 
power is gradually shifting from advanced Western states to emerging latecomers 
(Kupchan 2012; Zakaria 2009; Buzan and Lawson 2014). It is quite striking that the 
developed economies’ share of world GDP declined from 54 to 43 percent during 2004-
2014 (Kynge and Wheatley 2015). China, the most astounding ‘status seeker’ emerging 
power, has already surpassed the US in 2014 to become the largest economy in 
purchasing power parity terms (PwC 2015; Larson and Shevchenko 2010). It is expected 
that “in market exchange rate terms, China [will] overtake the US in 2028 despite its 
projected growth slowdown” (PwC 2015). The relative decline in US hegemony, in 
particular, injected a high dose of fluidity and uncertainty into the international system 
and opened up new opportunity windows for regional powers to shape respective regions 
in their own image (Buzan and Waiver 2003). Indeed, the global diffusion of power and 
the accompanied rise of emerging economies such as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, 
China, South Africa) and near-BRICS1 (Mexico, South Korea, Indonesia, Turkey) are 
contributing to the emergence of a new world (dis)order with significant possibilities for 
co-operation and conflict. It is now apparent that we are living in a “world of regions,” 
(Katzenstein 2005) in which the “emerging regional architecture of world politics” 
(Acharya 2007) demands a thorough analysis of the “multiregional system of 
international relations” (Hurrell 2007). 
 
                                                        
1 We use the term ‘near-BRICS’ for regional powers achieving high growth performance, demonstrating 
regional leadership ambitions and following economy-driven autonomous foreign policy strategies. In the 
literature there are alternative definitions attributed to these states, such as ‘middle powers’, ‘swing states’, 
‘emerging powers’ and ‘great peripheral states’. In this study we call them ‘near- BRICS’ in order to refer 
to the ‘demonstration effects’ of BRICS on these countries. In other words, these states possess 
characteristics similar to BRICS regarding their economic growth performance and rising regional and 
international presence; nevertheless, they are not as significant as BRICS in terms of their economic scale 
(see Öniş and Kutlay 2013, 1424).  
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An over-riding theme in this new multiregional system of international relations concerns 
the future of the liberal international order (Ikenberry 2010, 511; Mearsheimer 2010; 
Shambaugh 2013; Kagan 2008; Jacques 2009). There is no doubt that the changing power 
capacity, policy preferences, and role conceptions of emerging powers become key 
properties that inform the future of regional and global governance. However, the debate 
on emerging powers mainly concentrates on potentials and limits of BRICS for the future 
of international order. In contrast to the dominant trend in the literature that emphasizes 
the leading BRICS, our focus in this study is on the second group of ‘emerging middle 
powers’ or the ‘near-BRICS’ such as Turkey, Mexico and Indonesia, which tend to 
receive less attention in the existing literature. A plausible reason for this lacuna is that 
the middle power literature mostly deals with established middle powers such as Canada 
and Australia (Chapnick 1999, 2000; Ravenhill 1998; Carr 2014; Beeson 2011). There 
are a number of similarities and differences between established and emerging middle 
powers. The material capacity constraint in terms of military power, size, and 
demography are the common aspects of these two groups. The established and emerging 
powers, however, differ significantly in terms of their role model and governance 
capabilities within international system. Established middle powers are often considered 
as ‘catalysts’ for promoting a liberal international order, ‘facilitator’ for building pro 
status quo coalitions, and ‘manager’ for disseminating orthodox norms and practices in 
their respective region (Cooper, Higgott and Nossal 1993; Ravenhill 1998; Carr 2014). 
The emerging middle powers, which still remain an underexploited mine in the literature 
seem to have different qualifications in this aspect. First, the capacity of emerging middle 
powers to serve as successful role models and stability-providers is heavily constrained 
by the comparatively low quality of their own development and democratization 
experiences. Indeed, as Jordaan (2003, 171-172) points out unequal development appears 
to be a pervasive feature and the practice of liberal democracy still remains work in 
progress in such states. 
 
Second, domestic political economy features as well as semi-peripheral position in the 
hierarchy of global capitalism inevitably make emerging middle powers hesitant players 
in legitimizing the existing liberal international order, when compared with established 
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middle powers (Schweller 2011, 291). Rather, as Alden and Vieira underline (2005), their 
critique of the international system “has been rooted in a deeper structural analysis.” 
States of this nature face the dilemma that they are both critical of the existing liberal 
order dominated by the established Western powers, and at the same time they have an 
incentive to be a part of an international order based on liberal norms. Given these 
underlying dichotomies, some intricate and intriguing questions emerge: Under what 
conditions can emerging middle powers play a proactive role in the current international 
order? What are the dynamics, properties, and limits of emerging middle power activism 
in regional and global governance? Our central thesis is that emerging middle powers can 
make important contributions by amplifying their weight in regional and global 
governance. Their ultimate policy impact, however, depends on a mutually interacting 
and complementary set of conditions, composed of four material and ideational factors 
(see below). Having relied on middle power literature and extending it, the second part of 
the paper outlines this set of conditions that enables emerging middle powers to play a 
proactive role beyond their borders. The third and empirical part operationalizes the 
conceptual framework by turning a critical eye on Turkey as a striking but mainly 
underexplored case of ‘emerging middle power’ with potential demonstration effects in 
its neighboring regions and beyond. The final part offers some generalizations that 
inform the broader literature on emerging middle powers in regional and global 
governance.   
 
 
Emerging middle powers in regional and global governance: A framework 
for analysis      
 
Middle power is a contested and controversial concept in the literature (Cooper, Higgott 
and Nossal 1993; Ravenhill 1998; Carr 2014) to the extent that some scholars such as 
Chapnick (1999; 2000) even call it as a ‘myth’ rather than an analytical category. Middle 
powers, as Wang and French (2013) suggest, are players with constrained material 
capacity in comparison to major powers in world politics and, as a result, their ability to 
single-handedly influence key regional or global policy agendas or conflicts is heavily 
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restricted. On the other hand, these actors also have the capacity to “protect themselves 
from the undesirable impacts of other countries’ actions” (Wang and French 2013; also 
see Carr 2014, 71). This structural constraint, therefore, does not mean that world politics 
is a game only played by great powers. Especially in a post-hegemonic world order, 
middle powers have more room to maneuver through a variety of instruments and 
policies. The newly emerging middle powers in particular are becoming more vociferous 
in world affairs especially in the post-crisis global political economy setting (Sandal 
2014).2 In fact, as Cooper and Mo (2011) underline, “middle powers can punch above 
their weight”. Yet how can it be possible for emerging middle powers to exert influence 
beyond their borders? Under what conditions can these actors punch above their weight? 
Having relied on the mainstream literature on established middle powers (Cooper, 
Higgott and Nossal 1993; Ravenhill 1998) and synthesizing it with the recent debates 
(Jordaan 2003; Wang and French 2013), we shall identify four critical conditions, which 
allow emerging middle powers to play a productive role in a rapidly shifting global 
environment. These conditions include (i) the ability to serve as role models based on 
their soft power resources, i.e., the quality of their developmental and democratic 
credentials, (ii) the capacity to build effective coalitions with both established and 
emerging powers on the basis of a consistent set of normative principles, (iii) governance 
capacity based on a recognition of the limits of middle power influence and avoiding a 
mismatch of expectations and capabilities, and (iv) the capacity to identify niche areas in 
regional and global governance where they can make a distinct and unique contribution. 
In order for emerging middle powers to play proactive roles in regional and global 
governance they need to craft a comprehensive framework that recognizes the complex 
interdependence and meticulous synthesis of these four building blocks. We should state 
at the outset, however, that these four conditions are interactive and mutually inclusive, 
rather than hierarchic in terms of operationalization and implementation. The building 
blocs are also composed of relatively definitive/stable variables latent in all countries by 
virtue of being a middle power —such as material capabilities— and improvable limits                                                         
2 We should note that Sandal (2014) investigates middle power status/policies as a pragmatic legitimation 
strategy. However, we diverge from Sandal in the sense that we conceptualize middle power strategy in 
emerging powers more than being a legitimation strategy. We also see their roles as more than ‘mediators’ 
in international politics by putting emphasis on the broader conception of their role model capabilities.   
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—such as role model capabilities, niche diplomacy and alliance building capacity— 
depending on the context in which emerging middle powers operate. The importance of 
four building blocks might also vary according to the contextual factors, as it is the case 
in Turkish example that role model capacity predominates and guides other factors. This 
suggests that the non-hierarchic and interactive nature of the building blocks of middle 
power activism reflect not only pure foreign policy settings but also dynamic interaction 
of broadly structural and domestic political economy settings.         
 
 
 
 
Building blocks of emerging middle power activism 
 
The first criterion for emerging middle powers is related to their capability to serve as a 
role model both on a regional and global basis. This ability, in turn, is based on the 
quality of their economic development and democratization performance. South Korea is 
a good example of an emerging power, whose population is only 50 million. Though not 
a large country by the standards of China and India, its developmental performance has 
attracted significant international attention, as the literatures on developmental and post-
developmental states clearly testify. Following a long period of authoritarian rule, South 
Korea, unlike many other emerging powers, has managed to successfully consolidate 
liberal democracy over the past three decades. Indeed, South Korea has reached a per 
capita income of 25,000 US dollars, which places her safely in the realm of established 
rather than emerging middle powers (Shin 2015). South Korea example proves a good 
empirical record for being a role model as there is evidence available about other 
countries seeking out its experience in economic growth to learn from. It also 
demonstrates the ability of emerging middle powers to make a transition from emerging 
to established middle power status based on their role model and governance capacities. 
The transition in status, however, takes time, as the institutional structures need to be 
developed consistently and steadily. The cases of Mexico and Indonesia are also striking, 
since the two countries have not only achieved noteworthy economic development in 
recent decades, but have also managed to accomplish substantial transformations of their 
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political regimes from highly entrenched authoritarian systems to more open and 
relatively democratic polities. Needless to say, both Mexico and Indonesia lag 
significantly behind South Korea in terms of both economic development and democratic 
credentials. The political regimes of Mexico and Indonesia are still in the hybrid regime 
category, suggesting that they have some distance to travel in terms of consolidating 
liberal democracy. In comparative terms, the classic examples of established middle 
powers such as Canada and Australia are far more advanced in terms of their levels of 
economic development and their long-lasting commitment to liberal democratic norms 
(Jordaan 2003). It is quite striking, however, that the emerging middle power category 
includes a significant group of countries, which are consolidated democracies or hybrid 
regimes with a significant potential for further democratization. For instance, the MIKTA 
group or the second generation BRICS are broadly more democratic and hence more 
homogenous than the first generation BRICS, which includes both highly authoritarian 
(China and Russia) as well as democratic states (India, Brazil and South Africa). What is 
important for our purposes is that emerging middle powers, through their role 
conceptions, can contribute to the economic and democratic development of states, 
especially within but also beyond their immediate neighborhood to raise their own 
regional and international standing. As Patience (2014, 212) aptly accentuates where their 
role conceptions do “achieve positive currency within and outside [their] borders, other 
nation states may try to emulate [them], thereby not only establishing or enhancing [their] 
international legitimacy, but also transforming the circumstances of [their] region –or 
even aspects of the global order.” To this end, coherent and internationally recognized 
role models, especially in the realm of democratization and economic development, can 
upgrade the status of emerging middle powers.       
 
The second building block of middle power activism is related to effective alliance 
formation or coalition building. The ability of such states to form inclusive and 
encompassing coalitions on a consistent set of normative principles becomes a crucial 
variable that informs their foreign policy success (Ravenhill 1998, 312; Cooper, Higgott 
and Nossal 1993, 19). As Keohane (1969, 296) asserted, “a middle power is a state whose 
leaders consider that it cannot act alone effectively, but may be able to have a systemic 
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impact in a small group or through an international institution.” The classic cases of 
established middle powers such as Canada and Australia are illustrative cases in point, 
again. Both countries have a good record on building effective coalitions in compliance 
with their role models and governance capacities in niche areas (for details see Cooper 
1997; Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal 1993; also see below). In the current context, 
emerging middle powers, as well, are prone to multilateralism and strive hard to build 
effective coalitions at emerging international platforms like G20 with like-minded states 
because none of these actors are powerful enough to become influential on their own. 
Different than the established middle powers, given the fluidity of the current 
international order, the backbone of effective coalition building for emerging middle 
powers has two main dimensions. First, these states generally have historical links to 
established powers as they socialize in a US-led liberal international order. Turkey, for 
example, has deep historical and institutional links to the West. Mexico in the context of 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) depicts a similar pattern. However, 
these countries are ambitious and assertive enough to become more vociferous in the 
emerging regional architecture of world politics. This brings us to the second pillar of 
their multilateralism strategies. Given the loosening of structure-induced factors and 
widening scope of coalition building opportunities, emerging middle powers are now 
eager to hammer out regionalization agreements with other rising states. It is the premise 
of this article that emerging middle powers are capable of playing this dual role to 
immensely enhance their status, but will need to rely on building effective coalitions in 
line with their role conceptions and interest functions along strong and diverse networks. 
Their diplomatic skills to form effective, inclusive, and overlapping coalition-building 
will determine the extent to which they can assert their norms, values, and preferences in 
regional and global politics. For instance, MIKTA in this context is a noteworthy 
experiment, which brings together long-standing middle powers (Australia), a maturing 
middle power (South Korea) and emerging middle powers (Indonesia, Mexico and 
Turkey). It is interesting that MIKTA powers are also members of G-20, hence we have 
an unusual case of an overlapping coalition building, where emerging powers co-operate 
with other major and established emerging powers, and at the same time form their own 
grouping (Jongryn 2014).  
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The third building block of middle power activism involves the ability to achieve a 
balance between capabilities, on the one hand, and ambitions and expectations, on the 
other, which, in turn, is clearly related to the broader governance capacity of such states 
(Ravenhill 1998, 311). It is true that “power is now a more diffused, smarter and 
asymmetric concept” that provide ample space for middle power activism (Cooper 2013, 
970) yet this activism should constantly be checked and calibrated with underlying 
material capabilities. In fact, capabilities-expectations gaps are an imminent threat that 
looms large over middle powers. The emerging states, as ambitious status seekers in a 
changing international order, can easily plunge into a kind of power paradox. While 
trying to punch above their weight, these states can end up operating well below their 
potential. This paradox emerges where the leaders of emerging states overestimate their 
power capacities and opt for overambitious foreign policy strategies while they are 
navigating new alliance opportunities and niche areas to expand their might. The 
unintended consequence of power paradox generally tends to be the unfulfilled promises 
and unanswered threats that massively eradicate the credibility and potential stabilizing 
roles these states can play. In other words, due to their overambitious foreign policy 
rhetoric, which is inconsistent with material capabilities, these states, more often than not, 
entrap themselves with bold promises that they are unable to keep, as we shall 
demonstrate in detail in the Turkish case below. The discrepancy between the ‘rhetoric’ 
and ‘action’ emanating from the fragmented governing strategies, in turn, tend to 
jeopardize their prestige and influence. However, if middle powers can synchronize their 
capabilities and expectations, they may assume an effective balancing role and contribute 
towards a strengthening of a cooperation-based multipolar global order. 
 
The final element relates to the ability of emerging middle powers to identify niche areas 
in regional and global governance, where they can make a unique and exceptional 
contribution. As argued in the preceding paragraphs, middle powers tend to favor 
multilateralism and coalition building, due to the constraints imposed by the structure of 
the international system. To this end, they concentrate on certain niche areas to exert 
influence and gain competitive advantage in world politics. Cooper (1997), for instance, 
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asserts that middle powers navigate for gaps and they can fill and perform functional 
duties in global governance, which is called as ‘niche diplomacy.’ The established middle 
powers reflect successful examples of niche diplomacy. For instance, Canada is one of 
the countries that have exercised middle power leadership in human security agenda in 
global governance (Behringer 2005). Australia represents another successful example of 
niche diplomacy in the realms of human rights, environmental goals, and leadership on 
non-proliferation (quoted in Carr 2014, 74). Niche diplomacy is an increasingly crucial 
field of foreign policy activism for emerging middle powers as well. For example, the 
South Korean experience is again telling. South Korea, in the context of MIKTA has 
focused on building research and development capabilities and technology transfer as the 
key areas where it can make an effective contribution to other MIKTA members as well 
on a broader scale. Similarly, Brazil’s investments in global health diplomacy (Lee and 
Gomez 2011, 61-64), Mexico’s investments in global environmental politics, and 
Turkey’s achievements in humanitarian diplomacy are other striking cases of niche 
diplomacy that middle powers pursue in order to scale up their power and prestige. The 
key point in niche diplomacy, however, is that actions need to be consistent with overall 
capacity, foreign policy behavior and role conception. 
 
 
 
Emerging middle power activism: The paradoxical case of Turkey 
 
This part of the article concentrates on the Turkish example as an important but mainly 
underexploited case of emerging middle power activism in the literature. Turkey has 
demonstration capacity for other emerging middle powers and possesses a kind of critical 
case as recent activism in Turkish foreign policy reflects both the underlying potential 
and imminent constraints of emerging middle powers. There are three strands to the 
argument. First, Turkey is a striking case of an emerging middle power with rapid 
economic growth, intense democratization experience, and avowedly proactive foreign 
policy over the last decade. Turkish foreign policy makers during the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) era strove hard to position the country as a regional power, 
demonstrating robust forms of leadership at the regional and global platforms. Second, 
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the role conception of Turkey gradually shifted from a coercive actor toward a ‘benign 
regional power’ (Öniş 2013; Öniş 2011). Accordingly, Turkish political elites during the 
AKP era have become very eager to take responsibility at regional and international 
forums to enhance the status of the country by situating it as a role model in immediate 
neighborhood. Third, Turkey is a valuable case for the purposes of this paper not only 
because of its increasing capacity and political willingness to play an emerging middle 
power per se but also due to the failures and dramatic setbacks it encountered recently. 
Stated differently, the increasing discrepancy between the ambitions and capabilities in 
Turkish pro-activism and the unintended consequences stemming from policy 
miscalculations enable us derive some crucial lessons regarding the nature, potentials, 
and limits of emerging middle power pro-activism. The following pages, therefore, will 
delve into the details of the paradoxical case of Turkey in line with the framework 
outlined in the previous section.     
 
The virtuous cycle: Turkey as a promising emerging middle power 
 
The story of Turkey’s middle power activism is broadly a story of three major phases that 
demonstrate the ample potentials and imminent risks associated with middle power 
activism in world politics. The first phase, which provides illuminating examples on how 
middle powers can punch above their weight, is broadly the period spans from 2002 to 
2007. This period corresponds to the initial term of the AKP rule proved to be a real 
“golden age” under the strong impetus of the EU membership process. The second phase, 
covering AKP’s second period in office from 2007-2011 was an episode in which the 
AKP has firmly consolidated its political power in the domestic sphere with the decline in 
the power and influence of the military elites, which hitherto constituted an important 
veto player in Turkish politics. In retrospect, the second phase was a period of relative 
stagnation as the momentum of the reform process subsided in an environment where 
Turkey was faced with an increasingly negative international environment, with the onset 
of the global financial crisis and the stalemate in the EU membership process. The third 
phase, between 2011-2015, in contrast to previous ones, signified a major decline in the 
AKP’s performance concerning three interrelated realms of economic development, 
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democratization and foreign policy performance, with important ramifications for its 
ability to act as an effective emerging middle power in its immediate neighborhood and 
beyond. 
 
In the early years of the AKP, a process that was also facilitated by a favorable 
international environment, in particular the global liquidity boom, and the transformative 
impulse of the EU membership process, Turkey entered into a virtuous cycle that clearly 
boosted its capacity as a role model. The first pillar of Turkey’s middle power activism 
was the unprecedented performance of the Turkish economy. Following the devastating 
2001 economic crisis, Turkey embarked on a series of major economic reforms that 
spanned from a strict regulation of the financial sector to the establishment of a broad 
based macroeconomic discipline with a particular focus on the financial balances of the 
state. The experience of significant regulatory reforms started to be implemented by the 
coalition government in the aftermath of the devastating crisis of 2000-2001 and then 
continued during the AKP era in the presence of powerful external actors such as the 
IMF, the World Bank, and the EU. In the aftermath of the economic reforms that 
strengthened the state’s regulatory capacity, the Turkish economy performed well in 
comparison to its own historical standards. Turkey also fared well vis-à-vis the growth 
performance of the world economy. As a result, in current prices, GDP increased from 
233 billion US dollars in 2002 to 800 billion in 2014. Turkey’s total trade also 
skyrocketed from 114 to 476 billion US dollars in the same period. GDP per capita rose 
to 10,404 US dollars in 2014, a threefold increase in current prices (see table 1). Thought 
the increase in constant prices refers to a less impressive outcome, it is still the case that 
Turkish economy performed quite well in this period. 
 
 
 
 
2003 2005 2007 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
GDP (US $ billions, c. p.) 304.9 482 649 617 731.6 774 786.3 823 800.1 
GDP Per Capita (US $) 4,565 7,036 9,247 8,561 10,003 10,428 10,459 10,822 10,404 
GDP Growth (%) 5.3 8.4 4.6 -4.7 9 8.5 2.2 4.3 2.9 
Investment (% GDP) 17.4 21.4 21.8 17.2 18.9 22.1 20.6 20.6 20.5 
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Domestic Savings (% GDP) 15.5 16.0 15.5 13.2 13.5 14.4 14.5 13.4 14.9 
Imports (US $ billions) 69.3 116.8 170.1 140.9 185.5 240.8 236.5 251.7 242.2 
Exports (US $ billions) 47.3 73.5 107.3 102.1 113.9 135 152.5 151.8 157.6 
CAB (% GDP) -2.47 -4.57 -5.75 -2.24 -6.49 -9.7 -6 -7.9 -5.8 
FDI (US $ billions) 1.7 10 22 8.6 9.1 16.2 13.3 12.5 12.6 
Fiscal Balance (% GDP) -8.8 -1.3 -1.62 -5.5 -3.6 -1.4 -2.1 -1.2 -1.3 
Total Public Debt (% GDP) 74 59.6 46.5 40 46.1 42.4 39.2 36.1 33.5 
Unemployment 10.3 9.5 9.2 13.1 11.1 9.1 8.4 9 9.9 
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute, The Undersecretariat of Treasury and Ministry of Development 
 
The second pillar that helped enhancing Turkey’s promise to serve as a role model for its 
immediate and the extended neighborhood was the inspiring speed of democratization 
reforms embarked on during the early part of the decade, again a process that was 
initiated by the previous coalition government and continued under the AKP rule. A 
vibrant economic environment coincided with an unprecedented wave of democratization 
partially thanks to the acceleration in the EU candidacy process. During this period, 
Turkey enacted a series of liberalizing reforms that covered a wide range of areas 
including improvements in human rights regime, freedom of expression, freedom of 
assembly, gender equality, and minority rights (Müftüler-Baç 2005). Turkey also 
abolished the death penalty and crafted a new civil code in line with EU legislation. The 
anti-terror law, which was frequently criticized by European institutions, was also revised 
and liberalized. The rights of non-Muslim communities to build places of worship were 
recognized by the state and their properties were restored (Rodriguez, Avalos and Yılmaz 
2013). Furthermore, the demilitarization of Turkish politics intensified and the control of 
the military over Turkish politics was reduced significantly as part of EU-membership 
process so that civil-military relations were tilted in favor of the elected politicians 
(Keyman and Gümüşçü 2014). The enviable economic performance and impressive 
democratization record catapulted Turkey into a model in the eyes of the world as the 
only democratic Muslim country with a functioning market economy in a region where 
authoritarianism constitutes a norm. The Economist, for instance, noted “With its secular 
democracy, booming economy and growing international clout, Turkey has become an 
inspiration for Muslims around the world” (The Economist 2011).  
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In this context, the third pillar that contributed to Turkey’s ability to serve as a role model 
in its neighborhood was the proactive foreign policy of the government. During the 
course of the AKP’s first two terms in office, Turkey adopted an explicitly proactive 
foreign policy strategy that positioned Turkey as ‘an emerging soft power’ in its 
immediate neighborhood with strong linkages with its traditional transatlantic alliance. 
Stated differently, the governance of Turkish foreign policy mainly relied on a set of 
practices that prioritized mutually inclusive coalitions with established major players and 
emerging regional powers simultaneously. There are two dimensions of Turkey’s ‘smart 
coalition-formation’ strategy. First, the foreign policy making elite envisioned Turkey’s 
role conception as an impartial broker in the region. The AKP government reckoned, in 
the words of the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmet Davutoğlu, that “Turkey’s 
unique access to both the global north and south makes it a suitable mediator over a wide 
geographical range” (Davutoğlu 2013, 90). Accordingly, Turkey mediated Israel-Syria 
indirect talks in 2008 (Walker 2008); helped reconciliation between Iran and the West on 
the nuclear talks in a joint effort with Brazil (Hafezi 2010); and organized informal 
meetings among various political groups from different sects, ethnicities, and religions in 
the Middle East in general and Iraq in particular to mitigate the imminent conflict risks. 
In a similar vein, in order to strengthen its role as a ‘multiregional power,’ Ankara 
succeeded to bring Serbs and Bosniaks, archrivals in the Balkans, to join the “Trilateral 
Balkan Summit” in 2010 under the auspices of Abdullah Gül, the Turkish president of the 
time (Yinanç 2010). Another example of Turkey’s honest brinkmanship was the so-called 
Istanbul Process, launched in January 2011, which targeted the reconstruction of 
Afghanistan with all neighboring countries.37 Second, Turkey quested for a more visible 
stance beyond its immediate neighborhood in global fora. Following meticulous lobbying 
efforts, Ankara succeeded in becoming a non-permanent member of the UN Security 
Council for 2009-2010, which Turkish government accurately hailed as “a reflection of 
[Turkey’s] increasing weight in international politics and the confidence that the 
international community has in [Turkey]” (Hurriyet Daily News 2008). As of 2008, 
Turkey did not renew the stand-by agreement with the IMF and upgraded its status in the 
IMF from a ‘debtor’ to a ‘creditor’ country. Concomitantly, Turkish policy makers opted 
for a more active role in the governance of global finance and development in the post-
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crisis political economy landscape. It became an active member of G-20 summits, during 
which, the successful fisco-financial reforms adopted in the aftermath of 2001 crisis 
turned into an additional asset for Turkey to promote itself as a model country for 
emulation in the realm of global financial regulation at G-20 meetings. 
 
In terms of niche diplomacy, Turkey targeted key areas to expand its power and influence 
in global governance. As part of its role conception as a soft-power oriented regional and 
global actor, Turkey heavily invested in humanitarian diplomacy over the last decade. In 
fact, in the words of Davutoğlu, “humanitarian diplomacy [has become] one of the 
explanatory principles of Turkish foreign policy, probably the most significant one” 
(Davutoğlu 2013, 865). To this end, Turkey created public institutions and reinforced the 
existing ones to better coordinate humanitarian activities almost all around the world. 
Accordingly, Turkish Airlines, TİKA (Turkish International Cooperation and 
Coordination Agency), Kızılay (Turkish Red Crescent), TOKİ (Housing Development 
Administration of Turkey), and AFAD   (Emergency Disaster Management Presidency) 
gained prominence in the foreign policy repertoire, along with a plethora of humanitarian 
NGOs (Haşimi 2014). This “humanitarian turn” in Turkish foreign policy was reflected 
in numbers: The total amount of development assistance had reached 4.3 billion US 
dollars in 2013, up from only 133 million a decade ago (see figure below). Turkey now 
hosts almost 2.5 million Syrian refugees in its borders and spent more than 8 billion US 
dollars as of February 2016. As a result, Ankara’s ranking ascended from 19th to 3rd 
among government donors of international humanitarian aid.41 As Bayer and Keyman 
document, niche diplomacy in this period was pursued meticulously to position Turkey as 
a significant humanitarian actor (Bayer and Keyman 2012). Turkey adopted 
comprehensive policies to fill the gap in this niche area as Turkish policy makers see it fit 
into their broader proactive foreign policy perspective as soft power-driven regional 
player. 
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  Source: Turkish International Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) 
 
 
In summary, on the basis of a number of key indicators, Turkey improved its position in 
the hierarchy of international politics during 2002-2011. As a result, Turkey emerged as a 
promising middle power, which had influence and impact beyond its material power 
capacity. In all dimensions of middle power activism that is framed in this study Turkey 
became a textbook definition of how and through which mechanisms a middle power can 
punch above its weight. It appears that democratization, economic development, and 
multilateral foreign policy strategy impinged on and feed into one another, as a result of 
which, the country entered into an unmatched virtuous cycle. It therefore contributed to 
the stability and order in its neighborhood as a role model and source of inspiration.  
 
 
The vicious cycle: Turkey’s reversing fortunes as an emerging middle power 
 
If Turkey’s rise as an emerging middle power during 2002-2011 is the bright side of the 
coin, the post-2011 is equally striking since it demonstrates the conditions under which 
middle powers can exponentially erode their capacity and undermine their own potential. 
From this perspective, the Turkish case generates some crucial insights for the broader 
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literature on the nature and limits of emerging middle power activism. Rather ironically, 
Turkey plunged into a vicious cycle in terms of the democratization-economic 
development-foreign policy proactivism nexus during the post-2011 era, with the three 
elements feeding into one another and producing a powerful vicious cycle. First, there 
were significant setbacks and retreats on the democratization front. The 2011 general 
elections proved to be a crucial turning point in this context. In June 2011, the AKP 
succeeded in outperforming its rivals by obtaining almost half of the total votes, an 
exceptional achievement in Turkish political history. It was the first time for a political 
party to win three successive elections with increasing vote shares. This is an unusual 
phenomenon compared with Western style democracies, where incumbent powers have a 
tendency to lose their popularity over time as a result of governmental fatigue. This 
unprecedented success boosted the confidence of AKP elites and generated 
overconfidence on the part of the executive at a time when the checks and balance 
mechanisms that constrained the AKP and its powerful leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in 
the previous periods were progressively dismantled. Turkish democracy in the post-2011 
period suffered from the absence of effective opposition and powerful external anchors.  
 
In retrospect, the post-2011 period signified an era of ‘electoral hegemony,’ in which the 
power of a party becomes so strong that “it exceeds simply being a strong majority 
government” (Keyman 2014, 23-24). The AKP’s third term in office is therefore 
qualitatively different as domestic politics was increasingly characterized by intense 
polarization and gradual erosion of institutional checks and balance mechanisms under 
the exclusive accumulation of political power. Turkey during the final phase of the AKP 
era increasingly moved to a state of illiberal democracy. Özbudun argues that Turkey in 
this period was a ‘delegative democracy’, a type of democracy in which horizontal 
accountability, i.e., “accountability to other autonomous institutions of the state such as 
the legislature or the courts”, is almost non-existent (Özbudun 2014, 162). In retrospect, 
it appears that the unassailable electoral hegemony of the ruling party under a dominant 
and influential leader injected high dose of self-confidence and material resources to 
“rule in the way that they saw fit” (Öniş 2015, 26). As a result, the post-2011 witnessed 
the revitalization of heavy-handed Turkish state, with a traditional tendency to engineer 
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the social and political life from above —this time in a religiously conservative form 
through a series of changes in the education system, religious affairs, and control over the 
bureaucracy (Talbot 2015). 
 
Second, the Turkish economy also encountered important challenges in the post-2011 
period. There are two dimensions that lead to the reversing fortunes of the economy. 
Clearly, part of the problem was external and related to the new equilibrium that emerged 
in international economy following 2008 global financial crisis. In the post-2009, the 
global markets entered into a sharp turbulence, in which, low growth rates, declining 
foreign investment, and shrinking space for trade has become defining parameters of the 
new normal. Not surprisingly, Turkish economy was also influenced from the global 
slump (Öniş and Kutlay 2013). For instance, Turkey’s economic growth declined to 3.1 
percent annually in the post-2011, from almost 7 percent in the pre-crisis period. 
Turkey’s foreign direct investment performance also staggered due to the tightening 
liquidity conditions in the global markets (see table 1). Beyond the negative external 
influences, developments in the domestic plane also hampered Turkey’s economic 
performance. What was quite striking in this context was the way whereby the creeping 
authoritarianism in the political sphere spilled over and had negative repercussions in the 
economic realm. The independence of regulatory institutions was increasingly 
undermined. A good example was the growing interventionism by political authorities in 
the operations of the Central Bank. This clearly made a sharp contrast with the early 
years of the AKP rule where independent regulatory institutions constituted the part and 
parcel of a strong regulatory state that contributed to economic success (Özel 2012). 
Similarly, increasing politicization of public tenders and various rent-extraction 
mechanisms jeopardized the rule-based governance logic in the Turkish economy (Buğra 
and Savaşkan 2014; Today’s Zaman 2015). Another salient feature of the third phase of 
the AKP involved serious allegations of corruption against key party figures, a 
phenomenon that was conspicuously absent during earlier phases of the AKP era. These 
forces contributed to an episode of relative stagnation of the economy, clearly signified 
by the fact that Turkey’s GDP per capita appeared to be stuck around 10,500 US dollars 
over the last five years. The Turkish economy is confronted with serious challenges. It is 
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increasingly identified as one of the most risky countries among the emerging countries 
due high current account deficits and dependence on foreign capital (Beattie 2015). The 
fragile situation in question raised the possibility of a new domestically generated 
economic crisis for the first time since 2001; thereby undermined Turkey’s role model 
capabilities. 
 
The vicious cycle that has entrapped Turkey reached its peak with the paradigmatic shifts 
in Turkish foreign policy in the aftermath of the Arab upheavals. The political earthquake 
that shook the Arab world also reshuffled the fundamentals of Turkish foreign policy. In 
fact, in the initial phases, the tectonic transformations taking place in its neighborhood 
provided a historical window of opportunity for Turkey to expand ‘Turkish model’ 
throughout the region because for the first time in decades the establishment of a liberal 
democracy with free market economy has become a genuine possibility in the Muslim 
world. The then foreign minister Davutoğlu even uttered in the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly “A new Middle East is about to be born. [And Turkey] will be the owner, 
pioneer and the servant of this new Middle East” (Hurriyet Daily News 2012). The post-
Arab spring Turkish foreign policy, however, experienced certain inconsistencies, which 
undermined Turkey’s effectiveness as an influential emerging middle power.  
 
Turkey, in the new turbulent era of the Arab revolutions, increasingly suffered from 
rhetoric-action inconsistencies. While Turkish domestic politics experienced a striking 
illiberal turn under the electoral hegemony of the governing party, Turkey claimed to 
support democratic transitions in its neighborhood. The sharp divergence of domestic 
politics and foreign policy behavior clearly undermined the credibility of Turkey as a key 
actor of democracy promotion, in turn also undermining its ability to serve as a regional 
role model. Second, Turkey increasingly suffered from capabilities-expectations 
inconsistencies. Ankara’s over ambitions to position as an ‘order-setting regional power’ 
and transform the region in its mirror image led to Turkey’s over-involvement in the 
domestic affairs of key Arab spring countries, especially in the context of the ongoing 
war in Syria and the domestic turmoil in Egypt. The unintended outcome was the 
growing perception of Turkey as a country that increasingly contributed to instability in 
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the region by taking active part in sectarian conflicts that appeared to contrast sharply 
with its previous positive image of a benign regional power and honest broker. 
 
The era of the Arab revolutions has been a strenuous and, on the whole, disappointing 
period for Turkey’s middle power aspirations (Kuru 2015). In the pre-Arab spring era, 
Turkey has been able to position itself as a benign regional actor whose soft power was 
based on economic interdependence, cultural ties, and common identity. Democracy 
promotion was not explicit on the foreign policy agenda. From the onset of the Arab 
revolutions onwards, however, Turkey projected its image of a key democracy promotion 
actor. Beyond the turbulence and complexity of the region itself including the inherent 
resilience of the authoritarian structures that steadily undermined the early optimism 
associated with the Arab uprisings, Turkey undermined its own credentials due to a 
number of overlapping inconsistencies. While acting very assertively to accomplish 
political change in specific instances, like al-Assad’s Syria and Sisi’s Egypt and over-
intervening extensively, the AKP government also looked in the direction of authoritarian 
BRICS, identifying the Shanghai Corporation Organization as an alternative to the EU, 
which again sharply contrasted with its democracy promotion aspirations and credentials. 
It was not surprising, therefore that Turkey’s relations with its western allies faltered in 
the post-Arab uprisings. As a result inclusive and encompassing coalition building proved 
very hard to achieve for Turkish policy makers. While Turkey continued to be firmly 
anchored into Western security structures such as NATO and bilateral security ties 
between Turkey and the US continued to be important, the Western perception of Turkey 
was progressively of a country that was no longer an integral part of the Western identity. 
For instance, vital rifts have emerged between Turkey and the Western countries over 
Syria where Turkey has been single-mindedly committed to the removal of the al-Assad 
regime, whilst showing a certain reluctance to deal with the major threat from the 
Western perspective, the ISIS and the jihadist threat that it presented. Ironically, Turkey 
found itself increasingly isolated and once again encountered insurmountable security 
problems with a variety of countries in its neighborhood. Authoritarianism at home was 
accompanied by isolationism abroad, which key figures of the AKP foreign policy-
making elite also reluctantly acknowledged, using the term “precious isolationism” and 
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“value-centered isolationism” to denote “Turkey’s principled loneliness” (Hurriyet Daily 
News 2013).  
 
To be fair, Western powers also did not display an admirable record during the Arab 
uprisings. In Egypt, one could argue that the western powers failed to adequately engage 
with the Islamist actors preceding the coup and then failed to mount an effective 
challenge to Sisi’s military-based regime after the coup. Similarly, there was reluctance 
on the part of the Western states to challenge the Assad regime and the humanitarian 
crisis that it produced in the same way that they decided to deal with the Qaddafi regime 
in Libya. These criticisms are valid. However, they also illustrate the limits of how much 
Turkey could have achieved on the basis of its own actions as an extremely ambitious 
and pro-active actor, in a region where both great powers as well as important middle 
powers —including key regional actors like Saudi Arabia and Iran— have been actively 
involved. From a longer-term perspective, one could argue that the interests of Turkey 
and the Western powers did not diverge sharply. However, in the short run, major 
synchronization problems emerged between the parties (Yorulmazlar and Turhan 2015). 
This, in turn, paved the way for the deepening of the capabilities-expectations gap in 
Turkish foreign policy. Turkey increasingly projected the image of a ‘torn country’ in the 
emerging geo-political axis of the new order, where it has been uncomfortably placed 
between the Western axis, on the one hand, and the Russia-China axis, on the other. Its 
foreign policy has been characterized by oscillations between excessive unilateralism, on 
the one hand and commitment to multilateralism, on the other. In a striking fashion, 
Turkey found itself in a power paradox typical to emerging middle powers: While trying 
to punch above its weight, Turkey turned into an actor performing well below its 
capabilities.           
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Turkey as an emerging middle power: A balance sheet 
 Strengths Weaknesses Outcomes/Assessment 
Ability to Serve as a 
Role Model 
Significant economic development with an 
important jump in the early years of the AKP 
Era. Significant democratization reforms under 
the strong impetus of the EU. The only 
democratic country (with Israel) in a 
neighborhood where authoritarianism is norm. 
Weakening of economic performance coupled with 
a noticeable authoritarian turn in domestic politics 
during the final term of the AKP government has 
weakened Turkey’s claims to present itself as a 
role model. 
Significant potential coupled with 
a weakening of performance in 
recent years, reducing Turkey’s 
ability to present itself as an 
effective role model both on a 
regional and global basis. 
Coalition Building 
Capacity 
Enjoys traditional links to established 
democracies of the West, through NATO 
membership and candidacy for EU 
membership. Has become more active in global 
fora and with relations to major emerging 
powers both through active involvement in G-
20 and new organizations like MIKTA. 
Oscillations towards unilateralism and 
inconsistency in coalition building practices. 
Promoting democracy in the Middle East, whilst 
looking towards the authoritarian BRICS and the 
Shanghai Corporation Organization as a new 
reference point in foreign policy.  Weakening of 
the identity with the West and the EU. A 
combination of growing authoritarianism at home 
and unilateralism abroad leading to isolation. 
An uneasy mixture of 
multilateralism and unilateralism. 
Again weakening of performance 
in recent years, which has resulted 
in performance significantly below 
the country’s true potential. 
Governance Capacity 
and Capabilities-
Expectations Balance 
In the early stages of the AKP era, Turkey’s 
role has been in in line with an effective benign 
regional power role. Rediscovering its 
neighborhood and forming significant 
economic, diplomatic linkages with the 
multiple regions with which it has been 
engaged namely, the broader Middle East, 
Russia and Eurasia as well as the Balkans. 
A major mismatch between ambitions and 
capabilities, again starting from the later part of 
the AKP era; Over-activism abroad through 
engagement in the domestic political conflicts of 
countries like Syria and Egypt has been costly and 
has brought criticisms of Turkish foreign policy as 
being sectarian or divisive, contributing to regional 
instability.  
Weakening of Turkey’s role due to 
expectations-capabilities mismatch 
and the failure to govern Turkey’s 
foreign policy effectively and in 
line with middle power capacities. 
From a comparative perspective, 
an important case that has 
undermined its potential through 
over-interventionism. 
Identifying Niche Areas 
in Global Governance 
Turkey’s role conception as a mediator in key 
regional and international conflicts; 
Projecting itself as a key emerging donor and 
humanitarian actor, with an emphasis on 
helping the least developed nations; also 
presenting itself as a model in the area of 
banking regulation and financial governance 
following the successful restructuring in the 
aftermath of the 2001 crisis. 
Turkey’s role as a mediator undermined by its 
policy of taking sides in key disputes. Open door 
policy towards Syrian refuges in line with its 
claims to establish itself as a major humanitarian 
actor. The policy has been costly in terms of the 
number of refugees involved and the domestic 
insecurity and instability that this policy has 
generated. 
A mixed picture; elements of 
success coupled with elements of 
failure. Elements of failure are 
more striking in the recent era. 
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In conclusion, the authoritarian turn in Turkish politics and the eroding economic 
performance reversed the fortune of the country as a role model in the eyes of 
international and regional actors in the post-2011. The overambitious foreign policy 
strategies and inability to form inclusive and encompassing coalitions during the post-
Arab spring period undermined Turkey’s middle power activism. On that note, it is 
crucial to underscore that domestic politics, economic performance, and foreign policy 
activism impinged on one another in an interactive manner so that the vicious cycle 
informed all building blocks of Turkey’s middle power activism. As a result, Turkey, 
once seen as a Muslim mid-range country with a robust democratization performance and 
economic vibrancy, has gradually lost its attractiveness and potential to play a crucial 
stabilizer role in regional and global governance structures. The Economist described this 
sharp swing as follows: “Until recently Turkey, a NATO member that is in membership 
talks with the EU, was hailed as a shining example of a Muslim country where Islam and 
democracy can coexist. But a mix of hubris, pro-Sunni sectarianism and bad judgment on 
the part of the Islam-inspired Justice and Development (AK) party, has drained the 
country of its soft power” (The Economist 2014). 
 
 
Lessons learned from the Turkish case: Implications for broader literature 
 
This article strove to understand the properties, potentials and limits of emerging middle 
power activism in a changing global order. Extensive debate on the rise of emerging 
powers notwithstanding, the potential contributions of emerging middle powers in 
regional and global governance is an understudied issue in the literature. This study 
aimed to fill this gap by offering a broad conceptual framework for middle power 
activism and testing it with reference to the Turkish example, a striking but a neglected 
actor in the emerging middle power literature. To this end we offered a synthetic 
approach that aimed at combining mainstream literature (Cooper, Higgott and Nossal 
1993; Ravenhill 1998) with recent debates (Jordaan 2003; Wong and French 2013). 
Accordingly, we stated four interactive and mutually inclusive, rather than hierarchic 
factors that condition middle power activism. The building blocs are composed of 
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relatively definitive/stable variables latent in all countries by virtue of being a middle 
power —such as material capabilities— and improvable limits —such as role model 
capabilities, niche diplomacy and alliance building capacity— depending on the context 
in which emerging middle powers operate. We maintained that the importance of four 
building blocks might vary according to the contextual factors, as it was the case in 
Turkish example that role model capacity guided the other variables. We suggested that 
the non-hierarchic and interactive nature of the building blocks of middle power activism 
reflect not only pure foreign policy but also dynamic interaction of broadly structural and 
domestic political economy settings. To this end, the Turkish case has some remarkable 
ramifications for the broader discussion of emerging middle power activism.  
 
The first key lesson is that domestic political economy dynamics turns out to be a central 
driving force for emerging middle powers. The Turkish experience during the early part 
of the AKP era clearly demonstrates that favorable domestic political economy dynamics 
contributes to a virtuous cycle with positive spillover effects on its foreign policy and its 
ability to perform a constructive regional power role as a role model. By a similar logic, 
the latest phase of the AKP era shows how unfavorable political economy dynamics at 
home is translated into unproductive forms of foreign policy engagements, which through 
acts of excessive unilateralism and taking direct sides in difficult domestic conflicts of 
neighboring states can undermine the soft power capabilities of a potentially important 
middle power. These findings suggest that despite emerging middle powers have 
ambitions to ascertain themselves as role models and sources of inspiration in their 
respective regions in a changing global order, their political and economic development 
models still suffer from imminent domestic fragilities.   
 
The second broad implication is that, by definition, the term ‘emerging middle power’ 
signifies recognition of inherent limitations as well as capabilities. A cursory examination 
of Turkey’s Middle East policy during the era of the Arab uprisings clearly illustrates that 
the Turkish policy-makers had more grandiose schemes in mind. The emerging middle 
powers, in an age of excessive fluidity, find themselves on a knife-edge equilibrium in 
the sense that if they cannot synchronize their ambitions with capacities and balance of 
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power dynamics, they can easily turn into actors punching well below their weight as an 
unintended consequence of their unchecked proactive strategies. In that sense, the 
expectations-capabilities gap is a key factor that can undermine the effectiveness of 
emerging middle powers and turn them into contributors to instability rather than security 
producing actors. 
 
The third implication concerns the ability to build effective coalitions on the basis of a 
consistent set of normative principles. Emerging middle powers face with ubiquitous 
challenges in alliance preferences as well. On the one hand, they are more critical of the 
existing western-led world order and inclined to pursue delegitimization strategies. Stated 
differently, they can easily alienate themselves from their western allies. On the other 
hand, going unilateral or pursuing active alliances with other emerging powers prove 
highly detrimental for their stability and influence in global governance. In this sense, the 
crucial variable that ensures mutually inclusive and encompassing coalitions in an 
efficient manner is the set of principles that emerging middle powers rely on. The 
Turkish experience in the context of the Arab uprisings once again illustrates how an 
emerging power can undermine its international credibility and self-image through 
rhetoric-action inconsistency. The fact that Turkey was promoting itself as a democracy-
promoting actor abroad, whilst undermining democratic principles at home is a clear 
example of inconsistent norms and their pervasive impact on the alliance formation 
capacity of an emerging middle power.  
 
In conclusion, besides extrapolating some general tendencies in terms of the properties 
through which emerging middle powers can punch above their weight in global 
governance or suffer from acute power paradox, these cases also have certain unique 
characteristics as well. For instance, in the current tense verse of domestic affairs, the 
challenge for Turkey is whether it will have the capacity to reverse the negative political 
economy dynamics of the recent period and revitalize the momentum of the early phase 
of the AKP era, which will allow it to play a more constructive role in a highly turbulent 
region. From a broader point of view, the advantage of Turkey compared to other 
emerging middle powers is that it is located in a region where, in comparative terms, 
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there are more serious problems to be solved ranging from authoritarian resilience to 
weak economic development, failed states to jihadism. Hence, it is a region in which an 
emerging middle power can make a real impact, but only under the condition that it 
conforms to a certain set of principles that define the appropriate circumstances for 
effective middle power influence. Thus, in the final analysis, the framework proposed in 
this study should be applied by taking the contextual aspects of the regions in which these 
actors are embedded and socialized.  
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